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Essay
Who Cares What the Pundits Think of Kelo?
TIMOTHY S. HOLLISTER
In this Essay, Attorney Hollister reflects on more than thirty years of
involvement with eminent domain in Connecticut, primarily representing
property owners. He asserts that Kelo was correctly decided, but notes
that the exercise of eminent domain is ripe for misuse, and thus property
owners require advocacy and judicial oversight to protect their rights. He
summarizes Connecticut eminent domain procedure and analyzes the
General Assembly’s 2007 Kelo-inspired amendments. The Essay then
explains the importance in Connecticut of conducting a separate state law
analysis of property owner rights when challenging eminent domain,
particularly with regard to the “necessity” of the taking. The
Essay discusses Emery v. City of Middletown, the first court case to test a
municipality’s compliance with the 2007 amendments and in which
Attorney Hollister, representing the property owner, obtained an
injunction against the city’s proposed taking.
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Who Cares What the Pundits Think of Kelo?
TIMOTHY S. HOLLISTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
I, Hollister, could care less whether the result in Kelo v. New London
has been picked apart by conservative or liberal pundits, or apologized for
or fulminated about by Supreme Court justices. I’m a Connecticut land use
lawyer. While the federal Constitution and the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause constitute the “floor” of the shop in which I work, I am more
concerned with the tools I use regularly—the Connecticut Constitution,
state statutes, and municipal ordinances. What matters to me is: if a
municipal government or state agency files a notice of condemnation, and
an impacted property owner asks me for an evaluation of the legality of the
government’s use of eminent domain, what is the current state of the law,
and how do I protect her rights? This Essay, therefore, is mainly an effort
to summarize current Connecticut law in the wake of the procedural
reforms that our state adopted in 2007 in response to Kelo. My advice on
such matters is colored by my professional experience with eminent
domain and my tangential involvement in Kelo, and thus, in this Essay, I
do begin by weighing in on whether Kelo was correctly decided, but only
as a comment on whether the floor has been properly installed.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND ME
In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, I represented property
owners/developers in two cases in which Connecticut municipalities
initiated eminent domain proceedings to preempt affordable housing
applications filed with local zoning commissions under the Affordable
Housing Land Use Appeals Act.1 In the first case, under the guise of
*
Tim Hollister is a partner in the Hartford office of Shipman & Goodwin
LLP, http://www.shipmangoodwin.com/thollister. His practice focuses on land use, environmental, and
municipal law, and he co-chairs the firm’s twenty-five attorney Real Estate, Environmental, and Land
Use Practice Group.
1
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2010). The Act provides that if a developer agrees to preserve a
certain percentage of proposed residential units for moderate- or low-income households but a
municipal land use commission denies the application, the developer can appeal to the Superior Court
and the state agency has the burden of showing that its denial was based on a substantial public interest
in health or safety, and one that “clearly outweigh[s]” the town’s need for more lower cost housing. Id.;
see also Quarry Knoll II Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 780 A.2d 1, 17, 20 (Conn. 2001)
(determining that the commission properly stated that the reasons for its decision clearly outweighed
the need for affordable housing); River Bend Assocs., Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 856 A.2d 973, 986
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economic development, a town hastily prepared a development plan for a
so-called industrial park and then commenced eminent domain proceedings
with respect to the part of the overall parcels specifically proposed for
affordable housing, claiming that it was assembling land for economic
purposes.2 A trial judge enjoined the plan as “hastily assembled, poorly
envisioned and incomplete” and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed.3
In a second case, a town initiated eminent domain to stop a developer’s
appeal from the denial of an apartment development that allocated thirty
percent of its development to affordable housing, but the taking required a
town-wide referendum because the town was committing itself to pay just
compensation. When voters finally figured out that a vote to condemn the
land would result in a trial to establish the land’s value, and that the
amount of compensation was unknown but likely to be substantial, they
voted to terminate the taking.4
I then had a minor role in the run-up to the Kelo case. In New London,
the road into the ninety-plus acre area where Mrs. Kelo’s house was
located extends under a railroad bridge. In the early 2000’s, under that
bridge and on the site, there was a junkyard on the right and left sides. To
get the redevelopment underway, the New London Development
Corporation, in 2001, flush with state money and pushed by state and local
officials eager to begin implementing “the Plan” (the one that Attorneys
Horton and Levesque extol in their lead article here), needed to acquire
that junkyard. My partner Alan Lieberman and I represented the junkyard
owner.
We were delighted to be dealing with politically-pressured, amplyfunded government officials, who telegraphed their name-your-price
anxiety. We obtained for our client a compensation package that, shall we
say, exceeded fair market value. Our client happily retired to Florida. Yet, I
will always wonder whether, if he had held out for even more money, the
Development Corporation and the City might have commenced eminent
domain proceedings against the junkyard owner instead of Mrs. Kelo, the
seminal case would have been Calamari v. New London, and my place in
American legal history would have been secured. Sigh.
I also attended the Kelo U.S. Supreme Court argument in 2005. As a
member of the U.S. Supreme Court bar, I got in early and by a stroke of
luck, was shown to the seat directly behind the podium. Attorneys Horton
(Conn. 2004) (noting that the proper standard of review regarding whether the commission had
sustained its burden of proof was plenary review).
2
AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 290 (Conn. 2001).
3
Id. at 289, 300.
4
See Town of Darien v. Estate of D’Addario, 784 A.2d 337, 346 (Conn. 2001) (“[T]he voters
overturned the . . . decision to condemn the subject property.”). Attorney Jay Sandak argued the appeal
for the Estate in the Supreme Court.
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and Bullock, the oral advocates, would have landed in my lap had they
taken two steps back while arguing.
Then, in 2005–06, I advised the Connecticut General Assembly on
proposed amendments to the eminent domain statutes, an effort fueled by
the public outrage over the Kelo decision.5
In 2011, in an op-ed piece in the Connecticut Law Tribune, I raised the
issue that Mrs. Kelo’s house might have been saved had the Institute for
Justice, which had taken over representation of her and her neighbors at
trial (and later in the Connecticut Supreme Court), pursued a claim that the
Takings Clause of the Connecticut Constitution6 provides a higher level of
protection for property owners than the federal Takings Clause.7 I argued
that because the trial court held that Mrs. Kelo’s home was not necessary
for the redevelopment,8 the Institute could have focused, as a matter of
state constitutional interpretation, on the principle that government may
take only what is necessary for its stated public purpose.9 The Connecticut
Supreme Court, in its 2004 majority opinion, twice expressly noted the
Institute’s failure to provide a separate state constitutional analysis.10 In
fact, the justices seemed to telegraph that they might have considered
staking out a higher or different level of protection of Mrs. Kelo’s home on
the ground that New London could have pursued its plan while allowing
her home to remain.11
In my op-ed article, I surmised that the Institute, a national legal
advocacy organization, made a tactical decision to focus only on the issue
of whether the Takings Clause of the federal Fifth Amendment allows the
use of eminent domain to promote economic development.12 That is, I
raised the issue of whether the Institute purposely bypassed a state
constitutional claim that might have saved Mrs. Kelo’s home in order to
pursue the bigger, national, federal constitutional claim.13
5
As noted by Horton and Levesque, to date, more than forty states have implemented some type
of procedural reform for eminent domain in response to Kelo. Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P.
Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (2016); see also Ilya Somin, Let
There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York After Goldstein and Kaur, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1193, 1193, 1195 (2011) (describing how the New York Court of Appeals’ two recent blight
condemnation cases adopted an extremely broad definition of blight, which is in line with “many other
states that define blight expansively”).
6
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11.
7
Tim Hollister, The Little Secret of the Kelo Case, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2011, at 35.
8
Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *69 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13,
2002).
9
Hollister, supra note 7.
10
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 521 n.29, 563 nn.91–92 (Conn. 2004).
11
In fact, New London’s plan proposed residential townhomes, among other planned future uses.
12
Hollister, supra note 7.
13
See infra Part IV (noting that a separate state constitutional analysis might have saved Mrs.
Kelo’s house).
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My article drew a spirited disagreement from the Institute.14 Its
attorneys stated that they considered a separate state constitutional
analysis, but found no basis for it in Connecticut law, either in precedent or
in the text of Connecticut’s takings clause, Article I, § 11.15 The Institute
also pointed out that it had, on appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court,
asserted other state statutory and common law claims; if these claims had
been successful the case might have ended at the state court level.16
I responded in an op-ed rejoinder.17 I pointed out that the Institute had
conceded my main point, which was that they had not offered a separate
state constitutional analysis on the core issue of whether eminent domain
may be used to promote private economic development.18 They also did
not provide the Supreme Court a state constitutional analysis on an equal
protection claim.19 I also took issue with their explanation that they had not
pursued the separate state analysis because they had researched the law and
found no basis for differentiation.20 I pointed out (in addition to the
Supreme Court’s apparent exasperation) that under the seminal case of
State v. Geisler,21 there are at least six bases for a separate state
constitutional argument, including federal precedent, decisions from other
jurisdictions, and economic/sociological considerations.22 Thus, the
Institute’s own argument ignored three of the six Geisler factors.
Moreover, I could not fathom the claim that Connecticut precedent did not
support arguing for a higher state standard; in fact, in the six years directly
preceding Kelo, the Connecticut Supreme Court three times had struck
down abuses of eminent domain.23 Lastly, I noted that the Institute’s other
state law claims were statutory or common law, and thus peripheral at best
14
Scott Bullock & Dana Berliner, Setting the Record Straight on the Kelo Case, CONN. L. TRIB.,
Nov. 14, 2011, at 39.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Timothy S. Hollister, Kelo Case Tactics Receive Further Scrutiny, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 5,
2011, at 31.
18
Id.
19
See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 563 n.92 (Conn. 2004); Bullock &
Berliner, supra note 14.
20
Hollister, supra note 17.
21
610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992).
22
See id. at 1231–32 (explaining the six factor analysis which should be used to determine the
contours of fourth amendment protections under the state constitution); Hollister, supra note 17.
23
See Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 1167, 1174–76 (Conn. 2002)
(curtailing use of eminent domain because it was based on a redevelopment plan that was decades old
and had not been updated); Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 790 A.2d 1178, 1187–
88 (Conn. 2002) (stopping a condemnation because the redevelopment agency did not try to
incorporate the yacht club into the plan before using eminent domain); AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc. v.
Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 300, 312 (Conn. 2001) (enjoining use of eminent domain proposed
under a municipal economic development plan that was “hastily assembled” and “poorly envisioned,”
and for which plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to conclude that the plan was created in bad faith
to discriminate against families with children).
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to the central issue of the constitutionality of using eminent domain to
boost private economic development.24
Finally, in 2012–13, I litigated in Connecticut Superior Court the first
case to test a municipality’s compliance with the 2007 legislative
amendments.25
Thus, as to eminent domain and Kelo, I have a vantage point arising
from professional experience. My view is that Kelo was probably correctly
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, in the sense that the operation of
government for the public good at times may require the taking of private
property, over an owner’s objection, for economic development purposes.
In some instances, the justifications for the use of eminent domain will
include increasing property values, attracting private economic investment,
assembling parcels so the sum is more valuable than the pieces,
augmenting tax revenue, or some combination of these. Conversely, my
conclusion is that government planning and operations would suffer if any
use of eminent domain that is even partly based on an economic
development justification was categorically off-limits (even assuming we
could adequately define “economic development,” which is difficult at
best). Thus, as a citizen and land use attorney, I conclude that Kelo’s basic
endorsement of using eminent domain for private economic development
purposes—perhaps more accurately called the Court’s refusal to establish a
categorical prohibition on such use—was the right result.
But the Kelo holding was also the lesser of two evils. In my
experience, government’s use of eminent domain is not only
untrustworthy, but often an invitation to abuse. Few things can smell as
badly as the use of eminent domain to benefit a private business initiative.
The words “public good” and “public use” can easily paper over trumped
up justification studies, corruption, conflicts of interest, and trampling of
the rights of innocent property owners. Simply put, the power of eminent
domain is too easily used, and because it is wielded by politicians,
sometimes blatantly misused.26 I have witnessed town officials fabricate a
story about environmental contamination to justify a taking. 27 I have seen a
town claim that its motive in taking land for a parking lot was only to
Hollister, supra note 17.
Emery v. City of Middletown, No. MMXCV126008058S, 2013 WL 1943823, at *1, *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2013).
26
A related problem is the issue of what constitutes a constitutionally-protected property interest.
Rights to defend against eminent domain often depend upon whether the plaintiff—a contract purchaser
or long-term lessee, for example—has a sufficiently robust property as to have standing to challenge
abuse. But such property interests are often defined by government land use regulations. In other
words, government may not only stretch or misuse the power of eminent domain, but also undermine
who has a property interest.
27
See New England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, 988 A.2d 229, 256–57 (Conn. 2010)
(affirming a jury award of attorney’s fees in part because “the town had been dishonest when it asserted
that one of its reasons for the taking was to investigate and remediate environmental contamination”).
24
25
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relieve traffic congestion, only to find later in discovery an email showing
that the real purpose was to help a private business owner shore up a new
commercial venture that had been approved and built with insufficient
parking.28 I have watched an elected official champion the use of eminent
domain to diminish the value of a business operated by a political
opponent. And I’ve seen government officials hide behind exceptions in
the Freedom of Information Act to conceal eminent domain steps that
should be public and transparent.29
Eminent domain has been described by the courts as an “awesome
power.”30 It is, because it is the government’s authority to divest a citizen
of ownership of real property against his or her objection.31 All of the facts
about the aspects of the process in the City of New London that belie
favoritism or corruption—the Horton/Leydon invocation of precedent,
federalism, compensation, and democracy and Justice Zarella’s advocacy
of a “clear and convincing” benefits test32—are relevant but in the end not
responsive to the fundamental problems of the power mismatch between
the government and private citizens when government aligns with private
economic interests and deploys eminent domain to aid the private entity’s
financial goal. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 endorsement in Kelo of
the use of eminent domain in conjunction with private economic
development,33 and the state legislative reaction to Kelo34 (making eminent
domain procedurally harder in combination), seem to be the right result:
use of eminent domain to promote economic goals is at bottom
constitutional, but the power should be subject to a transparent process of
checks and balances, and available only as a last resort.
28
See infra Part V (describing communications between a mayor and town planner about
“grabbing . . . property” to provide parking for a commercial construction project).
29
The Connecticut Freedom of Information Act allows government officials who are negotiating
for the purchase of land to keep all documents that are part of the negotiation confidential. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 1-210(b)(7) (2015). One key problem is that government officials are empowered to decide
unilaterally when negotiations have begun, and sometimes claim to have done so at a very preliminary
stage.
30
See Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 875 (Minn. 2010) (“A state’s
ability to use eminent domain to take an individual’s property is an awesome power.”); Atlantic City v.
Cynwyd Investments, 689 A.2d 712, 721 (N.J. 1997) (“The condemnation process involves the
exercise of one of the most awesome powers of government.”); Winger v. Aires, 89 A.2d 521, 522 (Pa.
1952) (“The power of eminent domain, next to that of conscription of man power for war, is the most
awesome grant of power under the law of the land.”).
31
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (noting that the case involved a
development agent who proposed using eminent domain to wrest property from unwilling owners).
32
See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 602 (Conn. 2002) (Zarella, J., dissenting in
part) (explaining in dissent that the burden should be on the taking authority to prove that a public
interest will be served).
33
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470.
34
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FIVE YEARS AFTER KELO: THE SWEEPING BACKLASH AGAINST ONE OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST-DESPISED DECISIONS 3–4 (2010), http://ij.org/report/five-years-afterkelo/ (follow “Download” hyperlink).
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III. A PRIMER ON USING AND CHALLENGING
EMINENT DOMAIN IN CONNECTICUT
To trace how Kelo has affected eminent domain in Connecticut, it is
helpful first to summarize how eminent domain works and how it can be
challenged.
A. Connecticut’s Basic Process for Taking Land, As Amended in 2007
Eminent domain is one of the general powers of a Connecticut
municipality.35 The procedural instruction to municipalities for
condemnation is found in Connecticut General Statutes §§ 48-6 and 48-12,
which direct towns to follow the procedures stated in the redevelopment
agency statutes, which start at Connecticut General Statutes § 8-127.36 So
prior to 2007, to understand the procedure, one had to read the
redevelopment statutes by substituting “municipality” for “redevelopment
agency.” This was, and remains, confusing because a municipality per se is
a different entity than a redevelopment agency, and general municipal
powers procedures do not always align with redevelopment agency powers
and procedures.
Section 48-6 provides that when a municipality takes land, the process
of vesting title must be completed within six months of the legislative
body’s approval of the use of eminent domain.37 The expiration of this sixmonth period can be a tricky problem for municipal officials, because if
they dawdle or the property owner files for an injunction, the authorization
process may need to begin again, but this time often with much greater
public awareness, publicity, and challenges by affected owners.
Section 8-129(a)(2) requires two appraisers to value the property to be
taken and requires each appraiser to send to the property owner a copy of
the appraisal report, before the municipality formally initiates the
condemnation.38 The purpose of this requirement is to give the property
owner notice of the imminent taking and an opportunity to identify errors
in the appraisal before a town files its Notice of Condemnation and
Statement of Compensation.39
Section 8-129(a)(3) then provides that the municipality formally
initiates eminent domain by filing with the Superior Court a statement of
compensation, along with a deposit of the property’s asserted market
35
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-148(c)(3)(A) (2015) (explaining that “any municipality” has the
power to take private property for “any public use or purpose”).
36
Id. §§ 48-6, 48-12, 8-127.
37
Id. § 48-6.
38
Id. § 8-129(a)(2).
39
S. Proc. Vol. 50, pt. 13, at 4314–15 (Conn. 2007); H.R. Proc. Vol. 50, pt. 21, at 6954 (Conn.
2007).
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value. Section 8-129(b) then requires newspaper publication of notice of
the condemnation and certified mailing of a copy of the court filing when
the property owner is a non-resident.41 No less than thirty-five days or
more than ninety days after the condemnation notice, the condemning
authority prepares a return of service, which includes documenting
compliance with the notice requirements, receiving from the court clerk a
certificate of taking, and recording that certificate on the land records,
which vests title in the municipality.42
These are the basic, required steps under current law for a
municipality’s use of eminent domain.
With the current law outlined above, it is helpful to review what was
amended in 2007, and why. It is critical to understand that in 2007, when
the General Assembly enacted a variety of changes to eminent domain, it
did not have choice to undo this mess and start over. The 2007
amendments were additions, not revisions. The following procedures were
amended or added in 2007 by Connecticut Public Acts 07-141:
1. The requirement that each appraiser transmit a copy of the appraisal
report to the property owner before the taking is formally initiated was a
major change, because the Freedom of Information Act, General Statues
§§ 1-210(b)(7)-(8), allowed the government to keep all appraisals
confidential “until . . . all proceedings or transactions have been
terminated.”43
2. Connecticut Public Acts 07-141 lengthened from twelve to thirtyfive days the minimum time that a municipality must wait between its
court filings and obtaining a certificate of taking, to prevent what was
known as a “quick take,” which was arguably a due process violation.44
3. Connecticut Public Acts 07-141, § 4, removed from General
Statutes § 7-148(c)(3)(A)—the list of municipal powers—the authority to
use eminent domain for the encouragement of private commercial
development.45
4. Connecticut Public Acts 07-141, § 2, added to General
Statutes § 8-127a an express prohibition on the use of eminent domain
40

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-129(a)(3).
Id. § 8-129(b)(2).
42
Id. § 8-129(c).
43
Compare id. §§ 1-210(b)(7)–(8) (containing part of the Connecticut Freedom of Information
Act), with 2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 8 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-129(a)(2))
(containing the updated eminent domain requirement).
44
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 1(c) (Reg. Sess.); see also Brody v. Village of Port Chester,
434 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing the due process aspects of property owner notice of
eminent domain).
45
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 4 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-148(c)(3)(A)
(2015)).
40
41
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when the “primary purpose” of the taking is increasing local tax revenue.46
5. Connecticut Public Acts 07-141, § 2, as codified in General
Statutes § 8-127a (redevelopment)47 and § 1, codified in General
Statutes § 8-193 (municipal development),48 added provisions that if a
taking is for municipal redevelopment or economic development,
additional procedures and substantive limitations must be followed. In
other words, in Connecticut Public Acts 07-141, the legislature prohibited
all takings where the primary purpose is additional revenue, and specified
that takings for economic development or redevelopment purposes may be
carried out by a municipality only by following additional procedures and
providing additional due process and procedural protections beyond those
applicable to municipal takings.49 Such takings, among other requirements,
must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the town’s legislative body, and
just compensation deposited with the Superior Court must equal 125% of
fair market value, not just 100%.50
General Statutes § 8-127a(a)(4), added by Connecticut Public Acts 07141, § 2, expressly provides for the condemnee to seek an injunction
against a taking by a redevelopment agency,51 and General Statutes § 8193(b)(4) provides the same remedy to challenge eminent domain in aid of
an economic development project.52
Connecticut Public Acts 07-141 therefore requires a court to
determine: whether the primary purpose of a taking is increasing local tax
revenue; whether a taking constitutes redevelopment or economic
development, by identifying if a municipality is evading the new
procedures by improperly labeling its use of eminent domain as a mere
municipal action; and whether the 125% requirement is applicable.53
46
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 2 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-127a(a)(1)
(2015)).
47
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 2 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-127a
(2015)). As defined in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-125(1), “redevelopment” means “improvement by the
rehabilitation or demolition of structures, by the construction of new structures, improvements or
facilities, by the location or relocation of streets, parks and utilities, by replanning or by two or more of
these methods.”
48
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 1 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193 (2015)).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-187(4) defines a municipal “development project” as “[a] project conducted by
a municipality for the assembly, improvement and disposition of land or buildings or both to be used
principally for industrial or business purposes . . . .”
49
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, §§ 1, 2 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-193, 8127a (2015)).
50
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, §§ 3, 8 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-224,
8-129 (2015)).
51
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, § 2 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-127a(a)(4)
(2015)).
52
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193(b)(4).
53
2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141, §§ 1, 2, 8 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-193,
8-127a, 8-129 (2015)).
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The legislative history of Connecticut Public Acts 07-141 reinforces
and clarifies the textual amendments.54 Presenting the bill initially, Senator
McDonald explained that it made “extraordinarily significant changes in
the area of economic development eminent domain legislation,” including
banning takings for “the primary purpose of increasing local tax revenue,”
making elected officials “directly responsible” for use of eminent domain,
and adding substantial new requirements for notice of property owners.55
He described the detailed findings a municipality’s legislative body would
be required to make to justify a taking based on economic development. 56
He further noted that the legislation “would allow a property owner to
bring an injunction action against the municipality if it was acting in excess
of its statutory authority.”57
Addressing the burden of proof in challenges to eminent domain,
Senator McDonald later rose to oppose (successfully) an amendment by
Senator Fasano that would have expressly placed the burden on the
condemnor municipality to prove procedural and substantive compliance
with all eminent domain laws before taking title.58 Senator McDonald said:
[U]nder existing law that property owner would have a right
to provide [that a taking was illegal] just by a preponderance
of the evidence. It’s not a heavy, heavy burden. You would
just have to show, by the documents, that something wasn’t
right. That the I wasn’t dotted, that the T wasn’t crossed, that
somebody didn’t get notice . . . .59
In the House debate, Representative Lawlor, Judiciary Committee cochair, explained the bill’s main provisions.60 Representative Feltman noted
that one significant change was to delete takings for economic
development purposes from General Statutes § 7-148, the municipal
powers statute, to make it clear that takings for such purposes could only
occur in compliance with the new procedures in § 8-127a (redevelopment)
or § 8-193 (municipal economic development).61 Describing the new
procedures for economic development takings, Rep. Feltman stated that the
bill “makes clear that the burden on anyone trying to redevelop for
economic development purposes of any public body must be a very, very

In general, the legislative history of Conn. Pub. Acts 07-141 appears at S. Proc. Vol. 50, pts.
13–14, at 4304–4424 (Conn. 2007), and H.R. Proc. Vol. 50, pts. 21–22, at 6838–7007 (Conn. 2007).
55
S. Proc. Vol. 50, pt. 13, at 4308–10 (Conn. 2007).
56
Id. at 4309–14.
57
Id. at 4313.
58
S. Proc. Vol. 50, pt. 14, at 4382 (Conn. 2007).
59
Id. at 4383.
60
H.R. Proc. Vol. 50, pt. 21, at 6840–43 (Conn. 2007).
61
Id. at 6864–67.
54
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high burden . . . .”
Again, the 2007 provisions were procedural steps added to the basic
statutory framework of eminent domain, lengthening and clarifying the
process but also adding complexity, confusion, and traps for the unwary.
62

B. Challenging a Taking
There are six potential ways to litigate against city hall when it
condemns land: (1) procedural error in the taking process;63 (2) the
condemning entity does not have the power of eminent domain;64 (3) the
taking is not for public use/purposes;65 (4) the government is taking more
land than is necessary for the claimed public use;66 (5) the taking is in “bad
faith;”67 or (6) if the legality of the taking is conceded, the money paid
does not constitute “just compensation.”68
In Connecticut, these defenses are further shaped by what I call the
“Connecticut caveats.” First, as noted, our state constitution has its own
eminent domain provision, so a separate state constitutional analysis—
whether Connecticut will provide more protection for property owners than
the federal Takings Clause—should always be considered.69 Second, as a
general principle, takings procedures are strictly construed against the
condemning authority.70 Third, Connecticut allows environmental
remediation costs to be “deducted” from just compensation,71 which I think

Id. at 6919.
See, e.g., Town of Montville v. Antonino, 825 A.2d 230, 234 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (indicating
procedural errors can be a basis for challenging the legitimacy of a taking).
64
See, e.g., Greater Hartford Bridge Auth. v. Russo, 188 A.2d 874, 876 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963)
(indicating the state has the authority to condemn land for a public use provided it complies with all
constitutional and statutory provisions).
65
See, e.g., id. (noting the state’s authority to condemn land for a public use).
66
See, e.g., Mar. Ventures, LLC v. City of Norwalk, 855 A.2d 1011, 1017 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004),
aff’d, 894 A.2d 946 (Conn. 2006) (noting that the legislature has delegated to each redevelopment
agency the power to determine what property is necessary for a taking but this decision can be open to
judicial review).
67
See, e.g., New England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, 988 A.2d 229, 252 (Conn. 2010)
(acknowledging a government actor’s bad faith exercise of the power of eminent domain is a takings
clause violation).
68
Challenging the amount of compensation is deemed a waiver of challenges to the government’s
right to use eminent domain, as the two remedies are mutually exclusive. Cf. Conn. Light & Power Co.
v. Pub. Utilities Control Auth., 405 A.2d 638, 644 (Conn. 1978) (claiming the filing of a rate-increase
order by a public utility based upon an order given constitutes a waiver of an appeal from the order).
69
See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11.
70
Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 790 A.2d 1178, 1185 (Conn. 2002); State
v. McCook, 147 A. 126, 129 (Conn. 1929).
71
Ne. CT. Econ. All., Inc. v. ATC P’ship, 776 A.2d 1068, 1080 (Conn. 2001). In my opinion,
ATC Partnership is wrongly decided and an invitation to abuse because fair market value should be the
highest and best use of the property, estimating the method and cost of environmental remediation are
often educated guesswork at best, and environmental contamination may or may not be an impediment
62
63
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is an invitation to mischief. Fourth, it is important to keep in mind what
could be called the “red flags” of eminent domain, the warning signs of
potential abuse: (1) the condemning entity is not a governmental agency; 72
(2) a private party will pay or has paid some or all of the money used for
just compensation;73 (3) the primary beneficiary of eminent domain is or
will be a private entity whose finances are not public information; 74
(4) condemnation for “economic development” purposes rests on a study
procured by and paid by the condemning entity;75 (5) the condemnation is
for a use that will be privately operated;76 (6) the condemnation potentially
to economic reuse because sometimes pollution is inert and best left in place. ATC is now codified in
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-132(b).
72
See Timothy S. Hollister, Connecticut Eminent Domain Law in the Post-Kelo World, 16 CONN.
LAW. 14, 15 (2005) (listing several eminent domain practices that have been struck down or questioned
by courts, including the delegation of eminent domain power to a non-governmental agency).
73
See Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 3–4, 11 (Ill. 2002)
(exercising eminent domain authority for use by a private party, with an agreement that a private party
will reimburse the costs of acquisition, was deemed to be beyond constitutional authority for a taking).
74
See id. (taking a property under governmental authority for purely private purposes). In this
case, the main proponent of the taking was a privately owned, for-profit business, not subject to
freedom of information laws. See id. at 7–8. Economic development corporations can be a gray area as
to FOI disclosure obligations.
75
See AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 290–91, 302 (Conn. 2001)
(concluding that the town economic development commission’s hiring of a private firm to draft a
project plan for a high-tech industrial park, and subsequently using this plan to effectuate a taking,
constituted an act of bad faith).
76
S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 7. National City Environmental operated a metal recycling
business. Id. at 4. The Development Authority, a regional economic development agency known as
SWIDA, entered into a contract with Gateway International Motorsports Corp., the owner and operator
of an auto-racing speedway adjacent to National City, to use SWIDA’s “quick take” eminent domain
power to provide additional parking, and thus additional revenue, for the race track. Id. at 3–4. In the
contract, Gateway agreed to reimburse SWIDA the cost of the eminent domain process, including the
fair market value of the land taken. Id. at 4. National City brought an action under the federal Fifth
Amendment and the Illinois Constitution to enjoin the taking. Id. at 5. Affirming an injunction against
the taking as improper use of eminent domain, the Illinois Supreme Court said:
Entities such as SWIDA must always be mindful of expediency, cost
efficiency, and profitability while accepting the legislature’s charge to promote
development within their defined parameters. However, these goals must not be
allowed to overshadow the constitutional principles that lie at the heart of the power
with which SWIDA and similar entities have been entrusted. As Justice Kuehn
stated in dissent in the appellate court, “If property ownership is to remain what our
forefathers intended it to be, if it is to remain a part of the liberty we cherish, the
economic by-products of a private capitalist’s ability to develop land cannot justify a
surrender of ownership to eminent domain.”
While the activities here were undertaken in the guise of carrying out its
legislated mission, SWIDA’s true intentions were not clothed in an independent,
legitimate governmental decision to further a planned public use. SWIDA did not
conduct or commission a thorough study of the parking situation at Gateway. Nor
did it formulate any economic plan requiring additional parking at the racetrack.
SWIDA advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land at the request of “private
developers” for the “private use” of developers . . . . It appears SWIDA’s true
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violates a federal or state civil rights law—Fair Housing Act, Americans
with Disabilities Act,78 relocation statutes, etc.; and (7) stretching the
definition of “blight” to non-use/failure to maintain.79
77

C. Kelo’s Impacts in Connecticut
With this background, we can distill Kelo as having had four impacts
in Connecticut. First, due to extensive procedural amendments adopted in
2007, government compliance is much more complicated, filled with traps
for the unwary, and subject to challenges by property owners.80 Second,
with Kelo having blessed “economic development” as a public use under
the federal Takings Clause,81 a separate state constitutional analysis is
essential in every defense of a property owner. Third, in general, all across
the country, eminent domain has become a political third rail, to be used
only as a last resort or for politically acceptable, as opposed to municipally
needed, projects—though this may change as the memory of Kelo fades.
Finally, the current state of the law seems to be that governments,
proposing to use eminent domain, are now tasked with careful planning
and documentation of benefits; while property owners are required, in
order to stop takings, to root out speculation, favoritism, or corruption—
hardly a fair fight when civil rights are at stake.

intentions were to act as a default broker of land for Gateway’s proposed parking
plan.
....
As a result of the acquisition of NCE’s property, Gateway could realize an
estimated increase of $13 to $14 million in projected revenue per year. While we do
not deny that this expansion in revenue could potentially trickle down and bring
corresponding revenue increases to the region, revenue expansion alone does not
justify an improper and unacceptable expansion of the eminent domain power of the
government . . . .
Id. at 10–11 (citation omitted).
Thus, as part of its bases for enjoining the taking, the court cited the fact that a private business
was contributing money to the condemning authority and no study of necessity had been done. Id. at
10.
77
Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619 (2012)).
78
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
79
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954) (“Once the question of public purpose
has been decided, the amount and character of the land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”); Somin,
supra note 5, at 1201 (describing a potentially limitless definition of blight).
80
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 48-12 (2015) (listing additional statutory sections for condemning
land).
81
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005).
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF A SEPARATE STATE LAW
ANALYSIS, AND “NECESSITY”
In its 2004 opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court twice bemoaned
the fact that the Institute for Justice, lead counsel for Mrs. Kelo and her
neighbors, had not presented an analysis of whether the Connecticut
constitution provided greater civil rights protection for property owners
against the use of eminent domain to promote private economic
development than the Taking Clause of the federal Fifth Amendment,82 and
greater equal protection rights.83 As noted earlier, in 2011, I wrote an op-ed
piece for the Connecticut Law Tribune in which I pointed out the Supreme
Court’s admonishment of the plaintiffs, and wondered whether a separate
state constitutional analysis might have saved Mrs. Kelo’s house.84 In its
own decision, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that state courts were
empowered to interpret their own constitutions to provide greater
protection of property owners from eminent domain than Kelo’s federal
Fifth Amendment interpretation.85
The necessity requirement is a powerful tool, and thus warrants review
here. In the exercise of eminent domain, a municipality may only take
private property that is actually necessary to effectuate the stated public
purpose (which is one reason that the condemning entity needs to state
carefully what that public purpose is).86 A condemning authority cannot
take property that exceeds what, in good faith and within reasonable limits,
is necessary to carry out the stated public purposes. The prohibition on
excessive takings is of long standing in Connecticut, tracing its origins to
Boston & N.Y. Air Line R.R. Co. v. Coffin,87 wherein the Connecticut
Supreme Court noted that the taking entity “had no right to take surplus
lands in order to make their right of way through such lands cost less than
it could have been otherwise obtained for.”88
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 521 n.29 (Conn. 2004) (citations omitted).
See id. at 563 n.92 (“In their brief, the plaintiffs do not ‘provide an independent analysis
asserting the existence of a greater protection under the state constitutional provision than its federal
counterpart . . . [and] we will not on our own initiative address that question . . . .’” (quoting Donahue
v. Southington, 792 A.2d 76, 83 n.7 (Conn. 2002))).
84
Hollister, supra note 7.
85
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. Indeed, as Horton and Levesque note, at least two states, Ohio and
Oklahoma, have accepted the Kelo invitation and held that their state constitutions do not allow use of
eminent domain for private economic development purposes. Horton & Levesque, supra note 5, at
1420–21.
86
See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 557–59; Pequonnock Yacht Club v. City of Bridgeport, 790 A.2d 1178,
1184 (Conn. 2002); Toffolon v. Frankel, No. CV910712357, 1997 WL 399574, at *19 (Conn. Super.
Ct. July 1, 1997) (“A taking not justified by necessity is, by definition, unreasonable”).
87
50 Conn. 150 (1882).
88
Id. at 155. Necessity to support a taking is a criterion created by Connecticut court decisions; it
is not a requirement of the federal Fifth Amendment. See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538
U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003) (discussing the Fifth Amendment criteria).
82
83
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In In re New Haven Water Co., the court articulated why eminent
domain may not be used to take more land than is necessary for a public
purpose: “The property taken must be restricted to that which will
reasonably serve the public use; more than that would, in effect, be a
taking for private use and illegal because an abuse of power.”90
In Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Huschke,91 the trial court, relying
on these principles, denied an application to initiate eminent domain
proceedings seeking to take a 150-foot-wide utility easement where it was
clear that only an eighty-foot strip was necessary for the stated purpose.92
Similarly, in Toffolon v. Frankel,93 Judge Sheldon enjoined the
Commissioner of Transportation from taking the plaintiff’s land where that
land was not part of the original taking plan, and it was apparent at the time
of the taking that the subject property was not necessary and would never
be used for the DOT’s stated purpose of completing an interchange
modernization project.94 Judge Sheldon concluded that the proposed
“taking was plainly in abuse of the Commissioner’s statutory powers.”95
In Bugryn v. City of Bristol,96 the Appellate Court reiterated that it is
improper to “condemn any more property than is necessary to satisfy the
legislative mandate.”97 Although the court recognized that the judiciary is
not as well suited as the elected branches to make such determinations, it
indicated that, where the extent of a taking is challenged, “courts should be
cautious about disturbing the decision of the local authority” only to the
extent that “it appears that an honest judgment has been reasonably and
fairly exercised after a full hearing.”98
Thus, the Kelo decisions, both in the Connecticut Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court, all but mandate that any party contesting the use
89

85 A. 636 (1912).
Id. at 640; see also Ne. Gas Transmission Co. v. Collins, 87 A.2d 139, 146 (Conn. 1952)
(stating that “[t]he property which it is privileged to take is restricted to that which will reasonably
serve the public use; more than that would, in effect, be a taking for a private use and, hence, illegal as
an abuse of power”); Rubenstein v. Town of West Hartford, No. 348100, 1990 WL 279624, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990) (“The power of eminent domain by a condemning authority is to be
used sparingly, limited in scope to its governmental purpose and provid[ing] for just compensation. The
purpose and function of real estate condemnation, because it impinges upon the ownership of private
property, must necessarily by constitutional limitation be restricted to the minimum of taking required
in each instance.”).
91
409 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1979).
92
Id. at 156–57.
93
No. CV910712357, 1997 WL 399574 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 1, 1997).
94
Id. at *19.
95
Id.
96
774 A.2d 1042 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
97
Id. at 1050.
98
Id. at 1051 (citation omitted); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 561 (Conn.
2004) (“The condemnor’s right to acquire land for future expansion . . . is tempered by the need for a
suitable investigation to inform its assessment of future needs . . . . [T]he acquisition of land may not be
for real estate speculation and future sale, but rather, must be, in the intelligent, informed judgment of
the condemnor, in furtherance of an authorized public use.” (citation omitted)).
89
90
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of eminent domain provide a separate constitutional analysis and attempt to
establish a greater state law protection of property owners, with the
necessity of the taking to the stated public purpose being the most welldeveloped but by no means the only protection with a higher state law
profile.
V. KELO AMENDMENT IN ACTION: EMERY V. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN
In Emery v. City of Middletown,99 Keith and Marilyn Emery owned a
two-family residence on a one-third acre lot which, prior to 2012, had a
fenced rear yard, two-tenths of an acre, located at 12 Clinton Avenue in
Middletown, Connecticut.100 The rear of the Emerys’ property abutted a
parking lot of a new community health center that was constructed during
2010–11 and opened in June 2012. As the CHC construction got underway
in late 2010, its CEO engaged in several communications with the Mayor
and Town Planner about “grabbing . . . property” to provide parking for
CHC before “someone else . . . could come in and secure a log [sic]
lease.”101 The Town Planner then began physical and financial planning for
a public parking lot encompassing fifty-nine spaces laid out on several
parcels, including 12 Clinton Avenue Rear.102 The Town Planner and
Finance Director justified the taking by the property’s intended revenue
production:
REVENUE
59 parking spaces @ $60 per space
$42,480.00 per year supports $475,000 acquisition
CHC indicates [the health center] will rent 40 spaces at
market rate.103
Twenty-seven to twenty-nine of the fifty-nine spaces would be located
on 12 Clinton Avenue Rear, which at $60 per space, the Planner agreed,
would generate nearly $20,000 annually for the City.104 The City offered

99
No. MMXCV126008058S, 2013 WL 1943823 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2013); see also
Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Eminent Domain, 47 URB. LAW. 501, 523 (2015)
(describing recent eminent domain cases and concluding, “[m]ore and more [state] courts appear to be
delving deeper into a condemning agency’s power to take, and looking into issues with a more stringent
eye . . . . In the interim, the . . . state supreme courts interpreting takings provisions in their respective
constitutions—are where the interesting action is taking place”).
100
Emery, 2013 WL 1943823, at *1.
101
Post-Trial Brief of Plaintiffs Keith and Marilyn Emery, with Appendix, at 11, Emery, 2013
WL 1943823 (No. MMX CV 126008058S).
102
Id. at 12.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 13.
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the Emerys $50,000 for 12 Clinton Avenue Rear. The Emerys told the
Planner that they would not sell. The City moved to acquire the unused
back portion of 12 Clinton Avenue for $60,000, with CHC contributing
$50,000.106 The City did not obtain a parking utilization study. The City
obtained its second appraisal dated November 22, 2011, which
characterized the highest and best use of 12 Clinton Avenue as a “future
parking amenity” for redevelopment, but then valued it on a comparable
sales basis, using vacant/undeveloped parcels and did not employ the
income approach to value based on leasing monthly parking spaces.107
Neither the City nor the appraisers provided a copy of either the July 2011
or November 2011 appraisal to the Emerys in December 2011 or January–
February 2012. The City filed with the court a Notice of Condemnation
and a Statement of Compensation, dated January 3, 2012, stating its intent
to use eminent domain to take the 0.203-acre parcel at 12 Clinton Avenue
Rear, listing the intended public use as parking.108 The City deposited
$60,000 with the court as the asserted market value of the property.109 The
Planner confirmed that this amount was intended to be 100% of market
value, not 125% as would be required if the taking was for economic
development/redevelopment purposes.110 The Emerys then served an
Application for a Temporary and Permanent Injunction dated July 25,
2012, to prevent City officials from completing the eminent domain
process and vesting title.111
A procedural error occurred as the appraisals had not been transmitted
to the Emerys. The taking was for local revenue and economic
development, which requires 125% for just compensation. There was no
parking study, so no demonstration of need. The appraisals, not using the
income method, were bad faith condemnation. Also, there was untimely
notice.
The court issued an injunction since the City failed to provide the
appraisals and to publish timely notice.112
105

VI. CONCLUSION
I commend Attorneys Horton and Levesque for their U.S. Supreme
Court victory, their energetic participation in the national and state-by-state
Id.
Id.
107
Id. at 16.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 17.
112
Emery v. City of Middletown, No. MMXCV126008058S, 2013 WL 1943823, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2013).
105
106
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response to Kelo, and their insightful response to the commentary that Kelo
has generated. Yet, as a “dirt lawyer,” I would urge my colleagues at the
bar and government officials to regard eminent domain as a necessary evil,
a last resort to which government should turn only in the most compelling
circumstances, and only after thorough and unbiased studies, and only with
the potential for abuse and trampling of civil and property rights firmly in
mind, and those rights robustly protected.

